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LABOR LAW: DECIPHERING THE WORD FROM DELPHI
MICHAEL L. BRODY*
Of the forty-plus labor law cases handed down by the Seventh Cir-
cuit during its 1980-81 term, the vast majority were either routine, fac-
tually oriented administrative reviews, or relatively straightforward
applications of well-established precedent from the National Labor Re-
lations Board or other courts of appeals.' In two cases, however, the
court addressed itself to issues that are presently in a considerable state
of flux. Because both of these opinions are written in a terse, if not
oracular, style, and because both opinions reach holdings of considera-
ble import and dubious validity, an extended discussion of their ration-
ale and likely application is warranted. The two opinions at issue are
Peavey Co. v. NLRB 2 and Ryan v. .C Penney Co. 3 In Peavey, the
court summarily reversed a lengthy and unbroken line of its own deci-
sions applying the so-called "in part" causation test in cases involving
* Associate, Schiff Hardin & Waite, Chicago, Illinois; B.A., Wesleyan Univ.; M.A., J.D.,
University of Chicago. The opinions expressed in this article are those of the author alone. They
should not be attributed to his employer.
1. Since these decisions essentially speak for themselves, they are not discussed at length.
Still, the following cases may be of interest to Seventh Circuit practitioners: (1) NLRB v. Lyon &
Ryan Ford, Inc., 647 F.2d 745 (7th Cir. 1981) (approving award of backpay to unlawfully dis-
charged striker regardless of whether reinstatement had been sought), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 391
(1981). See Abilities & Goodwill, 241 N.L.R.B. 27, rev'd on other grounds, 612 F.2d 6 (1st Cir.
1979), in which the Board reversed 30 years of precedent by holding to this effect. (2) LaPorte
Transit Co. v. Local 301, Chauffeurs, Teamsters & Helpers, 638 F.2d 1095 (7th Cir. 1981) (dispute
between employer and union over proper assignment of work is not a "jurisdictional dispute" for
the purposes of §§ 8(b)(4)(D) and 10(k) of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C.
§§ 158(b)(4)(D), 160(k) (1976)), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 113 (1981). (3) Tinsley v. United Parcel
Service, Inc., 635 F.2d 1288 (7th Cir. 1980) (discussing employer's standing to invoke intra-union
exhaustion defense in cases involving § 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C.
§ 185 (1976)), vacaledmem., 101 S. Ct. 3072 (1981). (4) Rockford Redi-Mix Co. v. Zipp, 632 F.2d
32 (7th Cir. 1980) (raising, but failing to decide, issue of whether representation election is "valid"
so as to effect a bar on recognitional picketing during pendency of § 8(b)(7)(C) "expedited" elec-
tion, National Labor Relations Act § 8(b)(7)(C), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(7)(C) (1976)), cert. denied, 450
U.S. 929 (1981). See Retail Store Employees' Union, Local 692, 134 N.L.R.B. 686, 688-90 & 690
n.l 1(1961). (5) F.W. Woolworth Co. v. Miscellaneous Warehousemen's Union, Local 781, 629
F.2d 1204 (7th Cir. 1980) (right of individual employees to intervene for the purpose of appealing
district court's order vacating arbitral decision mandating their reinstatement), cert. denied, 451
U.S. 937 (1981). (6) Alvey v. General Elec. Co., 622 F.2d 1279 (7th Cir. 1980) (invalidating provi-
sion of union constitution prohibiting laid-off employees from maintaining their union member-
ship in good standing where provision effectively barred such employees from voting on alteration
of recall rights. Provision held to violate Landrum-Griffin's "Equal Rights" provision, 29 U.S.C.
§ 4 1 l(a)(l) (1976)).
2. 648 F.2d 460 (7th Cir. 1981).
3. 627 F.2d 836 (7th Cir. 1980).
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unlawful discrimination against union activists. In Ryan, the court
waded into the currently blossoming controversy over the rights of
"terminable at will" employees. Peavey is discussed in the second sec-
tion of this article. Ryan is discussed in the third.
The opening section of the article deals with the sole Seventh Cir-
cuit labor law case to be reviewed by the Supreme Court, Hendricks
County Rural Electric Membership Corp. v. NLRB. 4 In Hendricks, the
Seventh Circuit held that the NLRA does not apply to "confidential"
employees, thus creating enormous problems for the future of white
collar unionism. In one of the first decisions of its current term, the
Supreme Court reversed the Seventh Circuit decision in Hendricks.5
Because of the decision's considerable practical importance, an ex-
tended discussion of Hendricks' reasoning is warranted.
SCOPE OF THE ACT: CONFIDENTIAL EMPLOYEES
In Hendricks County Rural Electric Membershp Corp. v. NLRB, 6
the Seventh Circuit reaffirmed its previously stated view that "confi-
dential" employees are not covered by the National Labor Relations
Act. This construction of the Act was first enunciated in 1979, when the
court heard an earlier appeal of the Hendricks case.7 Both appeals of
the case concern the discharge of Mary M. Weatherman, personal sec-
retary to the general manager and chief executive officer of the Hen-
dricks County Rural Electric Membership Corporation. It was
undisputed that the reason for Weatherman's discharge was her deci-
sion to sign a petition requesting reinstatement of an injured fellow
employee. It was also undisputed, for the purposes of the appeal, that
such a discharge would be an unfair labor practice were Weatherman
deemed among those entitled to the NLRA's protections. The issue,
thus, was the scope of the Act's coverage.
The Board, in a 1978 order,8 had little trouble concluding that a
violation of the Act had occurred and ordered that Weatherman be
reinstated. While recognizing that some confidential employees are be-
yond the Act's purview, the Board had long restricted the scope of this
exemption by the application of a "labor nexus" test. That is, the
4. 627 F.2d 766 (7th Cit. 1980), rev'd, 102 S. Ct. 216 (1981).
5. NLRB v. Hendricks County Rural Elec. Membership Corp., 102 S. Ct. 216 (1981).
6. 627 F.2d 766 (7th Cir. 1980), rev'd, 102 S. Ct. 216 (1981) [hereinafter referred to as Hen-
dricks II].
7. Hendricks County Rural Elec. Membership Corp. v. NLRB, 603 F.2d 25 (7th Cir. 1979)
[hereinafter referred to as Hendricks 11.
8. Hendricks County Rural Elec. Membership Corp., 236 N.L.R.B. 1616 (1978).
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Board had exempted only those employees who possess confidential
information concerning labor relations. 9 The Board concluded that
Weatherman's confidential knowledge was not of this nature. The Sev-
enth Circuit was less certain. Holding, in Hendricks I, that the Board
applied the wrong legal standard, the court found that no confidential
employees are covered by the Act and remanded the case because the
Board had failed to consider whether or not Weatherman was pro-
tected under this rule of law.' 0 On remand, the Board once again
found a violation." On appeal, the Seventh Circuit disagreed, this
time simply denying enforcement of the Board's reinstatement order. 12
The Supreme Court came to a contrary conclusion.
At issue between the Seventh Circuit, the Board and the Supreme
Court was the proper interpretation of the congressional intent behind
certain provisions of the Taft-Hartley Act.13 Prior to 1947, the NLRA
did not explicitly distinguish between the protections afforded different
classes of employees. Moreover, though the Board had, at various
times and for various purposes, differentiated supervisory, managerial
and confidential employees from normal rank-and-fie workers, it had
never adopted any consistent, blanket policy with respect to any of the
groups. 14 Consequently, it is not surprising that one of the motives be-
hind the Taft-Hartley overhaul of the Act was a desire to systematize
this area of the law.' 5 As a result, section 2(3) of the Act was amended
to specify that "the term 'employee' shall. . . not include. . . any in-
dividual employed as a supervisor . "... ,,6 Section 2(11) was then ad-
ded to the Act for the purpose of defining the term "supervisor":
The term "supervisor" means any individual having authority, in the
interest of the employer, to hire, transfer, suspend, lay off, recall, pro-
mote, discharge, assign, reward, or discipline other employees or
responsibly to direct them, or to adjust their grievances, or effectively
to recommend such action, if in connection with the foregoing the
exercise of such authority is not of a merely routine or clerical na-
ture, but requires the use of independent judgment.' 7
Because no mention is made of any intent to exclude any confiden-
tial employees at all, on its face this statutory language does not even
9. E.g., B.F. Goodrich Co., 115 N.L.R.B. 722, 724 (1956); Ford Motor Co., 66 N.L.R.B.
1317, 1322 (1946).
10. 603 F.2d at 30.
i1. Hendrick County Rural Elec. Membership Corp., 247 N.L.R.B. 498 (1980).
12. 627 F.2d at 770.
13. 29 U.S.C. § 152(3), (11) (1976). See 627 F.2d at 768-70; 603 F.2d at 28-30.
14. See NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 275-79 (1974).
15. Id at 275-84.
16. 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1976).
17. Id § 152(1 1).
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compel the exclusion of those employees who meet the labor nexus test.
Neither, however, does the passage mention managerial employees.
Yet, despite the absence of any express statutory authorization, the
Supreme Court has read the legislative history behind these provisions
as evincing a clear congressional intent to exclude managerial employ-
ees from the Act.' 8 Relying on the arguably analogous passages in the
legislative history that relate to confidential employees, both Hendricks
panels found that confidential employees are unprotected.
This ruling was, at the least, somewhat surprising, coming as it did
in the wake of thirty-five years of consistently contrary Board prece-
dent' 9 and a number of equally inhospitable rulings in other circuits. 20
Moreover, as Judge Cudahy, dissenting from Hendricks II, pointed
out, the decision would have had two notable side effects, both of
which caution against enthusiastic adherence. For one thing, the rule
proposed by the Seventh Circuit could "strike a major blow at white
collar unionism. Many, if not most, white collar workers are involved
in something which may be argued to be 'confidential' in some general
sense. '"21 Additionally, the decision has the always unpleasant conse-
quence of transforming a previously well-charted area of the law into
potentially anarchic wilderness. In view of these prima facie reasons
for doubting the wisdom of the Hendricks decisions, it is not terribly
surprising that the Supreme Court reversed. The Supreme Court's de-
cision, however, is not without problems of its own. For regardless of
the considerable policy arguments in its favor, the Supreme Court's
Hendricks decision rests on a most dubious reading of the legislative
history. Inevitably, the starting point for evaluation of these decisions
must be the legislative history of the Taft-Hartley Act.
While the sources of discontent that led Congress to enact Taft-
Hartley were multiple, it cannot be denied that among them was a con-
cern over the Board's practice of certifying unions composed of super-
visory and managerial personnel. 22 Since it was in connection with this
concern over supervisors' unions that the matter of confidential em-
ployees arose,23 it is clear that the issue addressed by the Hendricks
18. NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 274-90 (1974).
19. See cases cited note 9 supra. See also Swift & Co., 129 N.L.R.B. 1391, 1393 (1961);
Dohrmann Commercial Co., 127 N.L.R.B. 205, 207 (1960).
20. See, e.g., Union Oil Co. v. NLRB, 607 F.2d 852 (9th Cir. 1979); NLRB v. Allied Prods.
Corp., 548 F.2d 644 (6th Cir. 1977); Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. NLRB, 398 F.2d 669, 670-71 (6th
Cir. 1968).
21. 627 F.2d at 722 (Cudahy, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
22. See NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 279 (1974).
23. See generall H.R. REP. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 13-17, reprintedin I NLRB, LEGIS-
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decisions can only be understood if placed in the context of this
broader problem. The matter of how to treat supervisors' unions had
been an issue of some dispute between the Board and Congress for at
least five years preceding the passage of Taft-Hartley. The first Board
decision to address the question was not handed down until 1942.24 It
recognized the right of supervisors to organize under the Act's protec-
tions and was promptly greeted with a proposal in Congress that fore-
men be exempted from the Act's coverage.25 While this legislation was
pending in committee, the Board chose to exhibit the better part of
valor by reversing its field and holding that collective bargaining units
made up of supervisory personnel would not be recognized under the
Act except in those trades where organization at this level had been the
common practice prior to 1935, the date of the NLRA's passage. 26
There the matter rested for two years until 1945, when the Board, dem-
onstrating the constancy of mind and dedication to principle that has
remained a hallmark of its jurisprudence, once again concluded that
supervisory and managerial employees were protected by the Act.27 In
a notably lukewarm opinion, and over a vigorous dissent from Justice
Douglas, the Supreme Court upheld the Board's authority to recognize
units made up of supervisory personnel. The decision, Packard Motor
Car Co. v. NLRB, 28 placed the onus for action squarely on Congress,
arguing that no explicit exemption for supervisory personnel was to be
found in the Act as then drafted, and that the sort of policy choice that
was entailed in implying such an exemption was a matter properly left
to the legislature. 29 In 1946, both houses of Congress, by substantial
majorities, passed legislation reversing the Packard decision only to see
their efforts foiled by President Truman's veto.30 Taft-Hartley consti-
tuted, in part, a renewed and more successful effort to respond to the
Court's challenge.
Congress was not secretive about the reasons it disapproved of the
Packard decision, and the legislative history is emphatically clear in
stating two principal objections to the notion of a supervisors' union.
The first and most frequently stated theme of discontent was the fear
LATIVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT, 1947, at 304-08 (1948) [hereinaf-
ter cited as LEGISLATIVE HISTORY].
24. Union Collieries Coal Co., 41 N.L.R.B. 961 (1942).
25. See H.R. REP. No. 245, supra note 23, at 13, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY at 304.
26. Maryland Drydock Co., 49 N.L.R.B. 733 (1943).
27. Packard Motor Car Co., 61 N.L.R.B. 4 (1945).
28. 330 U.S. 485, 488-90 (1947).
29. Id at 493.
30. H.R. REP. No. 245, supra note 23, at 14, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY at 305.
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that the Board's policy would effectively rob the nation's employers of
any ability to control their work forces. Thus, the various committee
reports abound in a variety of horror stories. These include tales of
work stoppages that imposed unacceptable risks to production, prop-
erty and occupational safety.31 They also include reports that supervi-
sors' unions had become the captives of rank-and-file organizations,
and that this sort of incestuous relationship had bred a refusal-some-
times express, sometimes merely implicit--on the part of supervisory
personnel to enforce plant discipline. 32 The resulting losses in produc-
tivity and increases in work-related injuries were viewed by Congress
as intolerable:
A recent development which probably more than any other sin-
gle factor has upset any real balance of power in the collective bar-
gaming process has been the successful efforts of labor organizations
to invoke the Wagner Act for covering supervisory personnel, tradi-
tionally regarded as part of management, into organizations com-
posed of or subservient to the unions of the very men they were hired
to supervise.
The folly of permitting a continuation of this policy is dramati-
cally illustrated by what has happened in the captive mines of the
Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. since supervisory employees were or-
ganized by the United Mine Workers under the protection of the act.
Disciplinary slips issued by the underground supervisors in these
mines have fallen off by two-thirds and the accident rate in each
mine has doubled.33
These problems were viewed by Congress as being particularly
troublesome because of the second reason given for disapproving of the
Packard rule: the congressional belief that supervisory and managerial
personnel are neither in need, of nor entitled to, the Act's protections.
The Taft-Hartley committee reports evidence a very clear sense of the
31. Id at 14-15, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY at 305-06.
32. Id at 15-16, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY at 306-07; S. REP. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 4-5
(1947), reprinted in I NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS
ACT, 1947, at 409-11 (1948).
33. S. REP. No. 105, supra note 32, at 3, 4, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY at 409, 410. To the same
effect, see, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 245, supra note 23, at 14, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY at 305:
The evidence before the committee shows clearly that unionizing supervisors under
the Labor Act is inconsistent with the purpose of the act to increase output of goods that
move in the stream of commerce, and thus to increase its flow. It is inconsistent with the
policy of Congress to assure to workers freedom from domination or control by their
supervisors in their organizing and bargaining activities. It is inconsistent with our pol-
icy to protect the rights of employers; they, as well as workers, are entitled to loyal repre-
sentatives in the plants, but when the foremen unionize, even in a union that claims to be
"independent" of the union of the rank and file, they are subject to influence and control
by the rank and file union, and, instead of their bossing the rank and file, the rank and
file bosses them.
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purposes that are to be served by the federal labor laws. The reports
emphasize the fact that the protections for collective action afforded to
rank-and-file employees are meant to alter the position of powerless-
ness and dependency that such workers would otherwise occupy in
their attempt to control any of the most fundamental terms of their on-
the-job life. The House Report was particularly explicit in its recogni-
tion that the Packard rule effected a virtual revolution in the philoso-
phy underlying the federal labor laws. Indeed, the committee's
discussion of the Packard issue begins by adverting to this very matter:
"When Congress passed the Labor Act, we were concerned, as we said
in its preamble, with the welfare of 'workers' and 'wage earners', not of
the boss. It was to protect workers and their unions against foremen,
not to unionize foremen, that Congress passed the Act."' 34 Moreover,
the fact that supervisors and managers were not among those in need of
such protection was made explicit:
Supervisors are management people. They have distinguished
themselves in their work. They have demonstrated their ability to
take care of themselves without depending upon the pressure of col-
lective action. No one forced them to become supervisors. They
abandoned the "collective security" of the rank and file voluntarily,
because they believed the opportunities thus opened to them to be
more valuable to them than such "security." It seems wrong, and it
is wrong, to subject people of this kind, who have demonstrated their
initiative, their ambition and their ability to get ahead, to the level-
ling processes of seniority, uniformity and standardization that the
Supreme Court recognizes as being the fundamental principles of
unionism. 35
The point is nowhere better summarized than in Justice Douglas' dis-
sent to the Packard opinion:
The present decision . . . tends to obliterate the line between man-
agement and labor. It lends the sanctions of federal law to unioniza-
tion at all levels of the industrial hierarchy. It tends to emphasize
that the basic opposing forces in industry are not management and
labor but the operating group on the one hand and the stockholder
and bondholder group on the other. The industrial problem as so
defined comes down to a contest over a fair division of the gross
receipts of industry between these two groups. The struggle for con-
34. H.R. REP. No. 245, supra note 23, at 13, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY at 304.
35. Id at 16-17, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY at 307-08 (citation omitted). The Senate Report was
less exercised about this aspect of the Packard rule, but it does cite approvingly to Justice Douglas'
dissent in the Packard case, see text accompanying note 36 infra, and it does note with horror that
"unless Congress amends the act in this respect its processes can be used to unionize even vice
presidents .. ." S. REP. No. 105, supra note 32, at 4, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY at 410.
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trol or power between management and labor becomes secondary
36
Thus, Congress' disapproval of the Packard rule was motivated by
a belief that the rule imposed substantial costs on American industry
without securing protection for anybody who was in need of it. The
question, insofar as the Hendricks decisions are concerned is what, if
anything, this policy evaluation has to say about the propriety of in-
cluding "confidential" employees under the Act's protective wing. The
answer is: not much.
At the outset, it is important to note that confidential employees,
unlike supervisory and managerial employees, are precisely the sort of
"workers" and "wage earners" who were intended as the prime benefi-
ciaries of the Act. The mere fact that an employee shares his em-
ployer's secrets does not alter the balance of power or the nature of the
struggle between them. It is still the employer who hires and fires; who
sets wages, and hours, and every other term of employment. Moreover,
a personal secretary or a low level engineer or accountant can hardly be
said to have "demonstrated . . . [an] . . . ability to take care of...
[himself] without depending upon the pressure of collective action"
merely by accepting a position that entails the possession of some confi-
dential knowledge. Neither is there any reason to view such conduct as
implying a desire to "abandon the 'collective security' of the rank and
file" for the "opportunities" of a job unencumbered by the "seniority,
uniformity, and standardization" that are "fundamental" to unionism.
As a result, the balance of policies operative in the case of confidential
employees is radically different from the balance that is operative in the
case of supervisory employees. Denying supervisory employees cover-
age under the Act does little to impede the Act from serving the pur-
poses it was intended to serve. Consequently, virtually any adverse
consequence that may result from coverage would, on balance, justify
an exclusion. In contrast, an exclusion barring confidential employees
from the Act's protections would serve to isolate from the Act's
processes exactly the sort of worker those processes were meant to
serve. This result goes to the very heart of the Act's mission. Accord-
ingly, if the confidential worker is to be properly analogized to the su-
pervisory or managerial employee, it can only be because the employer
has such an overwhelming need for the undivided loyalty of such work-
ers that a balance favoring exclusion can be struck.
The version of Taft-Hartley that was originally reported onto the
House floor contained a provision expressly excluding confidential em-
36. Packard Motor Car Co. v. NLRB, 330 U.S. 485, 494 (1947) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
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ployees from the Act's coverage. 37 The Committee Report endorsing
this provision found that employers did, in fact, have an extraordinary
need for the loyalty of confidential employees, and that this need de-
rived from the employer's interest in protecting the confidential infor-
mation to which such employees are privy:
Other employees [aside from those who can be classified as
managerial or supervisory] handle intimate details of the business
that frequently are highly confidential. Some affect the employer's
relations with labor. Others affect its relations with its competitors.
In neither case should the employee's loyalty be divided. That which
affects the company's relations with its competitors certainly ought
not to be open to members of a union that deals also with the firm's
competitors. 38
But this consideration is insufficient as a rationale for excluding
confidential employees from the Act's coverage. Employers have al-
ways had legal recourse against anyone who appropriates a trade secret
for his own use or the use of another. 39 Similarly, well-established
common law tort actions exist to secure relief in the event that an em-
ployer suffers intentional interference with existing contractual rela-
tions or intentional interference with a concrete business expectancy. 40
Thus, it is simply wrong to assume, as the House Committee apparently
did, that an employer would be defenseless against a union possessed
of his secrets. Moreover, to the extent that the loyalty of a confidential
employee is not insured by these common law doctrines-to the extent,
that is, that these potential injurious disclosures are not of the sort tra-
ditionally recognized as deserving a remedy at law--the question arises
as to how seriously the risks of divided loyalty should be taken and
why the risks have suddenly become deserving of legal recognition.4'
This is particularly true since the possessors of such confidences, to the
extent that their jobs are neither managerial nor supervisory in nature,
have a strong claim of entitlement to protection under the Act. In
short, the policy considerations which Congress carefully marshalled in
37. H.R. 3020, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. § 2(12)(C) (1947), reprinted in I NLRB, LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY OF THE LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS AcT, 1947, at 168 (1948).
38. H.R. REP. No. 245, supra note 23, at 16, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY at 307. See also id at 23,
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY at 314.
39. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757 (1939).
40. W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS §§ 129, 130 (4th ed. 1971).
41. One also has to wonder what sort of line drawing problems might emerge in determining
the scope of such a newly protectable realm of confidential information. If an employee is a
confidential employee even though he is not possessed of information traditionally deemed "pro-
prietary," does this classification apply to an employee possessed of any non-public information,
no matter how trivial? If the value of the secret information to the employer is the touchstone,
how long will it take before this new category of confidential information collapses into the old
one?
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opposition to the Packard decision cut little ice in support of the rule
proposed in the Seventh Circuit's decision in Hendricks I. Indeed,
were policy the only issue in the Hendricks case, there would be every
reason to believe that the Supreme Court's reversal was proper.42
The courts, however, are not the governmental institution charged
with the formulation of policy; if the legislative history indicates that
Congress intended to exclude confidential employees from the Act,
however unpersuasive the reasons, then the courts should have little
option but to accede to Congress' wishes. It was this sort of reasoning
that the Seventh Circuit relied upon, and, the Supreme Court's decision
notwithstanding, it is difficult to argue with its conclusions.
The original version of Taft-Hartley was enacted by the House of
Representatives. As noted above, that bill's definition of the term "su-
pervisor" included a section which specified that the Act did not protect
any employee "who by the nature of his duties is given by the employer
42. Writing in dissent, Justice Powell offered a contrary policy analysis. This analysis begins
by emphasizing that the holding of NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267 (1974), recognized
the "clear intent of Congress to exclude from the coverage of the Act all individuals allied with
management." NLRB v. Hendricks County Rural Elec. Membership Corp., 102 S. Ct. 216, 230
(1981) (Powell, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original). The Board's labor nexus test, he argued,
makes some limited sense because it excludes from the Act confidential employees who are so
allied:
But useful as it may be in identifying employees who are allied to management, the
"labor nexus" test is but a means to this end. By its rigid insistence on the labor nexus in
the case of confidential secretaries, the Board and now this Court, have lost sight of the
basic purpose of the labor nexus test itself and of the fundamental theory of our labor
laws.
Id. The argument concludes with an assertion that
it makes little sense to exclude "expediters," "assistant buyers," and "employment inter-
viewers" as managerial but include within the rank and file confidential secretaries who
are privy to the most sensitive details of management decisionmaking, who work closely
with managers on a personal and daily basis, and who occupy a position of trust incom-
patible with labor management strife.
Id. at 230-31.
The problem with this argument is its closing factual assertion-namely, the assertion that an
employment relationship involving proximity to and the confidence of management personnel
necessarily transforms the employee into an "ally" of management. By this logic, any particularly
skilled, knowledgeable, or otherwise valuable employee would be an ally of management. In fact,
secretaries and other confidential employees are likely to find themselves in direct conflict with
management on issues relating to wages and other 'terms and conditions of employment. The
purpose of the NLRA, Justice Powell's views aside, is not to assure that people who work closely
together are never brought into conflict. Rather, the Act proceeds from the premise that such
people will inevitably have conflicting interests insofar as some are managerial and some are not.
The purpose of the Act is to regulate such conflicts in a way that minimizes industrial strife while
assuring all parties a fair opportunity to bargain for their point of view. A confidential employee
should have as much of a right to benefit from the Act's efforts in this direction as any other non-
managerial employee.
Moreover, the point of the labor nexus test is not to determine when an employee is an "ally"
of management, but rather, to determine when the granting of organizational rights to such an
employee would so undermine the employer's ability to maintain shop discipline as to undermine
another of the Act's fundamental policies, that of encouraging "the smooth flow" of commerce.
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information that is of a confidential nature, and that is not available to
the public, to competitors, or to employees generally, for use is in the
interest of the employer." 43 The House Committee was under the mis-
taken impression that the Board was already in the habit of excluding
such employees from the Act's coverage, 44 but it felt that "protecting
confidential financial information from competitors and speculators,
protecting secret processes and experiments from competitors, and pro-
tecting other vital secrets ought not to rest in the. administrative discre-
tion of the Board. . . .
The Senate version of the Act, in contrast, made no express men-
tion of confidential employees, and the legislative history in that cham-
ber is equally silent on the subject. Moreover, when the two bills were
sent to conference, the Senate version prevailed, and the House's spe-
cific exemption of confidential employees was dropped. It is this ap-
parent rejection of the House provision that the Supreme Court gave as
its principal reason for believing that Congress had not intended to ex-
clude confidential employees from the Act.46
While this construction of the legislative history has an unarguable
surface appeal, it does not bear up well after careful scrutiny of the
43. H.R. 3020, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. § 2(12)(C) (1947), reprinted in I NLRB, LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY OF THE LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT, 1947, at 168 (1948).
44. H.R. REP. No. 245, supra note 23, at 23, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY at 314. But see Ford
Motor Co., 66 N.L.R.B. 1317, 1322 (1946).
45. H.R. REP. No. 245, supra note 23, at 23, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY at 314.
46. The opinion does offer an alternative reason for reading the legislative history as not
intending such an exclusion. This second reason was Taft-Hartley's express inclusion of "profes-
sional" employees under the Act's protections. 29 U.S.C. §§ 159(b), 152(12) (1976). Noting that
"almost all such persons would likely be privy to confidential business information," the Court
stated, "It would therefore be extraordinary to read an implied exclusion for confidential employ-
ees into the statute that would swallow up and displace almost the entirety of the professional-
employee inclusion." NLRB v. Hendricks County Rural Elec. Membership Corp., 102 S. Ct. 216,
226 (1981). The definition of a professional employee under the Act includes all persons who
perform primarily intellectual work involving the consistent exercise of discretion and requiring
knowledge customarily acquired by study for an advanced degree. 29 U.S.C. § 152(12) (1976).
While it is undoubtedly true that many such employees have confidential knowledge, it is proba-
bly also true that many such employees have managerial responsibilities; yet this overlap between
the categories was not even mentioned by the Court in BelAerospace as a reason to avoid exclud-
ing managerial workers from the Act. NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267 (1974). More-
over, it is doubtful that "almost all" professional employees are in possession of confidential
information. Unless one takes an extraordinarily broad view of the concept of confidential infor-
mation, it is hard to imagine how such knowledge would tend to come to such professionals as
nurses, engineers in well-established fields of technology, accountants responsible for non-secret
accounts, in-house attorneys responsible for the defense of slip-and-fall cases or the prosecution of
collection cases, and so on. Finally, even if it were a fact that most professional employees are
also confidential employees, it is also true that many confidential employees-secretaries, for ex-
ample, or some highly skilled artisans-are not professionals. Thus, it may be that Congress
merely wanted to exclude those confidential employees who are not also professionals, or, alterna-
tively, that the intention was that the Board and courts would be required to strike a balance of
some sort in cases where the two categories overlapped.
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legislative record. Indeed, the Conference Committee Report makes it
clear that the decision to drop the House provision was not intended to
slight the House's desire to see such employees excluded. Rather, the
conferees indicated that they, like the House Committee, believed that
the Board made a practice of excluding confidential employees, and
then concluded that the relevant language from the House bill could
therefore be omitted as unnecessary:
In the case of persons working in the labor relations, personnel and
employment departments, it was not thought necessary to make spe-
cific provision, as was done in the House bill, since the Board has
treated, and presumably will continue to treat, such persons as
outside the scope of the act. This is the prevailing Board practice
with respect to such people as confidential secretaries as well, and it
was not the intention of the conferees to alter this practice in any
respect.
47
The Supreme Court opinion sought to avoid the clear thrust of this
passage with two arguments. First, it asserted that the implication that
Congress misapprehended the Board's actual rule is mistaken. Thus,
the Court rehearsed in great detail the pre-1947 Board decisions incor-
porating the labor nexus test,48 emphasized that the labor nexus test
had expressly been brought to the attention of Congress through the
Board's Annual Reports, 49 and concluded that "[c]ertainly the Confer-
ence Committee, in approving the Board's 'prevailing practice,' was
aware of the Board's line of decisions."'50 From this the Court inferred
that the Board practice endorsed by the conferees was the labor nexus
test.
This reading of the legislative history, however, simply ignores the
passage in the House Report, quoted above, which, in so many words,
attributes to the Board the practice of excluding all confidential em-
ployees, regardless of their involvement in labor relations, from the
protection of the Act. The language of the Conference Report, aside
from the fact that it is equally unqualified in its reference to the Board
practice regarding "confidential secretaries," must be read against the
background of these views. This is so for two reasons. First, it is so
because these were the views that underlay the provision that the report
was addressing. Second, it was necessary to read the Conference Re-
port against the background of the House Report because the members
47. HOUSE CONF. REP. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 35 (1947), reprintedin I NLRB, LEGIS-
LATIVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS AcT, 1947, at 539 (1948).
48. NLRB v. Hendricks County Rural Elec. Membership Corp., 102 S. Ct. 216, 223 (1981).
49. Id. at 227 n.20.
50. Id. at 227.
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of the House Committee were also members of the Conference and, as
such, co-authors of the Conference Report. Thus, the only fair reading
of the report is that it was intended to leave intact a Board policy of
excluding confidential employees, even though that policy did not in
fact exist.
As an alternative means of avoiding the implication that the con-
ferees thought they were endorsing a Board policy excluding confiden-
tial employees, the Court suggests that the Conference Report merely
was meant to defer to the Board's expertise in this matter, leaving fur-
ther development of the law in its hands. 51 Certainly this reading of
the Conference Report is strictly consistent with the conferees' lan-
guage, for all that the Conference Report literally says is that the con-
ferees presume that Board practice would remain constant on this issue,
and that they did not intend to "alter . . . [it] .. .in any respect." 52
Moreover, the plausibility of this strict reading is reinforced by the fact
that the House Committee had stated that its intent in expressly ex-
empting confidential employees was a desire to eliminate such Board
discretion. Thus, it is not at all far-fetched to infer that by eliminating
the House provision, the conferees may well have intended simultane-
ously to reject the House's goal of bridling the Board. The legislative
history, however, does make it clear that Congress did not approve of
the prospect of unionized confidential employees, and that it was only
because Congress believed that the Board shared this view that the
Board was given its head. It seems a strained reading of the Taft-
Hartley debates to view them as approving a development of the case
law which endorses the position that the Board favors today.
These considerations, taken together, strongly suggest that the Sev-
enth Circuit Hendricks decisions accurately analyzed the legislative his-
tory of Taft-Hartley and that this analysis should have been approved
by the Supreme Court. Still, because the blanket exclusion of confiden-
tial employees from the protections of the NLRA makes little sense in
terms of the Act's underlying policies, the Supreme Court's decision
can hardly be viewed with sorrow. At the same time, there can be no
doubt that this decision bears little resemblance to the result that Con-
gress thought it had achieved in 1947.
51. Id. at 226 n.19.
52. HOUSE CONF. REP. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 35 (1947), reprinted in I NLRB, LEGIS-
LATIVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT, 1947, at 539 (1948).
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THE "MIXED MOTIVE" PROBLEM
While the Hendricks decisions marked an abrupt departure from
well-established precedent of the Board and the prevailing rule in other
circuits, they did not depart from existing Seventh Circuit case law. In
Peavey Co. v. NLRB,53 however, the Seventh Circuit directly overruled
a long-standing line of its own decisions.
The issue in Peavey was the proper construction of section 8(a)(3)
of the NLRA. This portion of the Act establishes that "[it shall be an
unfair labor practice for an employer. . . by discrimination in regard
to hire or tenure of employment or any term or condition of employ-
ment to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization
.. . .- Section 8(a)(3) is often applied in tandem with the prohibi-
tion of section 8(a)(l), 5 making it unlawful for an employer to "inter-
fere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights
guaranteed" under the Act. Together, the sections bar employers from
purposely taking actions that have the effect of penalizing unionism.
The existence of an anti-union motivation, or "animus," behind the
challenged conduct has always been elemental to the existence of sec-
tion 8(a)(1) and section 8(a)(3) violations,56 but, not surprisingly, it has
proven somewhat elusive of an appropriate, easily applied evidentiary
standard. This difficulty is particularly preeminent among the legion of
"mixed motive" cases-that is, cases where an employer's pleasure at
striking a blow against unionism happens to arguably or actually coin-
cide with a legitimate business motivation for the employer's conduct.
Nonetheless, the standard to be applied in these cases has been
well-settled in this circuit for some time. Indeed, as recently as Febru-
ary 1981, a panel of this court routinely stated its adherence to the so-
called "in part" test: "Our own decisions hold a discharge to be illegal
if a 'bad' motive contributes in a significant way to the discharge. ' 57 In
Peavey, this rule was abandoned. Relying on the Board's decision in
the recent Wright Line case,58 the court held that
Under the new test the General Counsel must first make aprimafa-
cie showing that the employee's protected conduct was a motivating
factor in the employer's decision to discharge the employee. Once
this is established, the burden shifts to the employer to demonstrate
that he would have discharged the employee even in the absence of
53. 648 F.2d 460 (7th Cir. 1981).
54. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1976).
55. Id § 158(a)(1).
56. See Radio Officers Union v. NLRB, 247 U.S. 17 (1954).
57. Sullair P.T.O., Inc. v. NLRB, 641 F.2d 500, 504 n.4 (7th Cir. 1981).
58. 251 N.L.R.B. 1083 (1980), a~fd in part, rev'd in part, 662 F.2d 899 (1st Cir. 1981).
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the protected conduct . . .59
The test is meant to echo the standard for liability established by the
Supreme Court in M. Healthy City School District Board of Education
v. Doyle,60 a case involving a mixed motive firing allegedly infringing
the plaintiff's first amendment rights. The Peavey opinion simply
adopts by reference the reasoning of Mt. Healthy and Wright Line with
little additional comment.6' Because the application of Mt. Healthy to
the labor law context is not self-evident, and because the Wright Line
test is not without its ambiguities, a careful evaluation of the test's ra-
tionale and significance is clearly in order.
The difficulty in proving unlawful motive in section 8(a)(3) cases
derives from the not-surprising fact that very few employers baldly ad-
mit that they are engaging in unlawful conduct. As a result, proof of
illicit motive has normally turned on the availability of circumstantial
evidence, and the Supreme Court has long mandated use of the tort law
presumption that "a man is held to intend the foreseeable consequences
of his conduct. '62 The question has been how much weight to accord
this presumption. In NLRB v. Great Dane Trailers, Inc. ,63 the Court
attempted to establish a framework within which it would operate. The
Court held that where an employer's conduct is "inherently destruc-
tive" of employee rights, the conduct "bears 'its own indicia of in-
tent.' 64 Under these circumstances, and regardless of the legitimate
explanations that the employer may offer for his behavior, "the Board
may nevertheless draw an inference of improper motive from the con-
duct itself .... '65 The Board has not, by and large, been bashful
about drawing such inferences, and the tendency, indeed the routine,66
has been to treat conduct that is inherently destructive of employee
rights as having been improperly motivated.67 Thus, the truly difficult
cases, insofar as the issue of motivation is concerned, are those where
59. 648 F.2d 460, 461 (7th Cir. 1981).
60. 429 U.S. 274 (1977).
61. 648 F.2d at 461-62.
62. Radio Officers Union v. NLRB, 247 U.S. 17, 45 (1954). See also NLRB v. Erie Resistor
Corp., 373 U.S. 221, 227-28 (1963).
63. 388 U.S. 26 (1967).
64. Id at 33 (quoting NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp., 373 U.S. 221, 231 (1963)).
65. 388 U.S. at 33.
66. See, e.g., Wright Line, 251 N.L.R.B. 1083, 1088 (1980), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 662
F.2d 899 (1st Cir. 1981) where the Board seems to assume that the problem of "dual motivation"
does not even arise in the case of "inherently destructive" conduct.
67. This is not, of course, the same thing as saying that such conduct is necessarily unlawful;
for once a showing of improper motive is made, the Board must "exercise its duty to strike the
proper balance between the asserted business justifications and the invasion of employee rights in
light of the Act and its policy." NLRB v. Great Dane Trailers, Inc., 388 U.S. 26, 33-34 (1967).
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the employer's conduct is not so egregious as to bear "its own indicia of
intent." In these cases, where the "harm to employee rights is compar-
atively slight," the teaching of Great Dane is that the tort law presump-
tion applies prima facie, but "an affirmative showing of improper
motivation must be made. . . # the employer has come forward with
evidence of legitimate and substantial business justifications for the
conduct. ' 68 The difficulty arises when both the employer and the
Board have shouldered their respective burdens of proof-when, that
is, the employer has adduced evidence of a legitimate business motiva-
tion for the conduct and the Board has adduced affirmative evidence of
unlawful anti-union animus. In this situation, it is clearly unfair to say
that the employer was simply acting out of an unlawful motivation,
but, at the same time, it is clearly inaccurate to say that unlawful con-
siderations were totally lacking. It is to this "mixed motive" tangle that
Peavey and the decisions on which it relies-Wright Line and Mt.
Healthy-address themselves.69
Prior to Wright Line, the courts of appeals dealt with mixed mo-
tive cases by the use of one of two strategies. As noted above, the strat-
egy followed by the Board and in this circuit dictated that a violation
be found where the employer's conduct was caused "in part" by an
improper motive. 70 In contrast, several other circuits, following the
lead of the First Circuit in NLAB v. Billen Shoe Co. ,71 have held that a
section 8(a)(3) violation can only be found where the General Counsel
demonstrates that the employer's illegal motive was "dominant" over
his legitimate one:
When good cause for criticism or discharge [of a union activist] ap-
pears, the burden which is on the Board is not simply to discover
some evidence of improper motive, but to find an affirmative and
persuasive reason why the employer rejected the good cause and
chose a bad one. The mere existence of anti-union animus is not
enough.72
68. Id at 34 (emphasis in original).
69. A related, but conceptually distinct, problem arises in the so-called "pretext" cases.
These are cases where the employer's purported justification either did not exist or was not in fact
relied on. In such cases the issue is not evaluating the relative significance of two independent
causes of the employer's conduct, but how to recognize that one of the two purported causes does
not exist. The pretext case raises the question of what the evidence shows. The dual motive case
raises the question of the significance of the established facts. See generaly Wright Line, 251
N.L.R.B. 1083, 1083-84 (1980), aff'dinpart, rev'd in part, 662 F.2d 899 (1st Cir. 1981).
70. Id at 1084, 1086 n.8; NLRB v. Gogin, 575 F.2d 596, 601 (7th Cir. 1978).
71. 397 F.2d 801 (1st Cir. 1968).
72. Id at 803. Actually, the tests applied by the various circuits do not fall with precision
into these two categories. Thus, for example, some of the "in part" circuits have demanded that
the employer's conduct be based "in significant part" on an anti-union motive. Eg., St. Luke's
Memorial Hosp., Inc. v. NLRB, 623 F.2d 1173, 1180 (7th Cir. 1980). Cf. Pelton Casteel, Inc. v.
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The Board in Wright Line rejected both alternatives.
The Wright Line test has two essential elements. The first is the
standard of liability imposed by the test. This branch of the test estab-
lishes that no section 8(a)(3) violation will be found if the employer's
anti-union sentiments are not a "but for" cause of his anti-union con-
duct.73 The second branch of the test establishes a scheme of proof for
determining whether or not the standard of liability has been met. The
initial burden is placed on the General Counsel. It obligates him to
show that an improper consideration was a "substantial" or "motivat-
ing" factor giving rise to the challenged conduct. Once this is estab-
lished, the burden falls on the employer to prove as an affirmative
defense that, regardless of his anti-union sentiments, other lawful con-
cerns would have led him to behave as he did in any event.74
It is not difficult to see why the Board preferred this scheme of
proof to the dominant motive test outlined in Billen Shoe; both Billen
Shoe's standard of liability and its structure of burdens are problem-
atic. The dominant motive test requires the General Counsel to prove
that the employer has "rejected the good cause [for his conduct] and
chosen the bad one," a standard of liability which comes perilously
close to requiring that the General Counsel prove that the employer's
proferred justification for his conduct is a mere pretext. Certainly,
where this is the case-that is, where an asserted legitimate justification
for anti-union behavior is a mere sham--section 8(a)(3) liability must
be found. Still, there is no reason to believe that liability is proper only
in such cases.
An employer may have perfectly legitimate reasons for disliking
an employee which he has not "rejected" at the time he acts to that
employee's detriment. Where these views, no matter how genuinely
NLRB, 627 F.2d 23, 30 (7th Cir. 1980) (citing St. Luke'r, and recognizing a de minimis motivation
defense in § 8(a)(3) cases). Similarly, in the years since Mt. Healthy, several of the dominant
motive circuits have rejected Billen Shoe's requirement that the General Counsel all but establish
that the employer's explanation is mere pretext, see note 66 supra, requiring instead that the Gen-
eral Counsel establish that the unlawful motive was the "but for" cause of the employer's conduct.
E.g., NLRB v. Eastern Smelting Corp., 598 F.2d 666, 671 (1st Cir. 1979); Federal-Mogul Corp. v.
NLRB, 566 F.2d 1245, 1259-60 (5th Cir. 1978); Waterbury Community Antenna, Inc. v. NLRB,
587 F.2d 90, 98 (2d Cir. 1978). Finally, some circuits have simply wandered all over the map.
Compare, e.g., Allen v. NLRB, 561 F.2d 976, 982 (D.C. Cir. 1977), with Midwest Regional Joint
Bd. v. NLRB, 564 F.2d 434, 440 (D.C. Cir. 1977). For the sake of explaining the Wright Line
standard--essentially a "but for" test-this article simplifies the confusion of case law in the man-
ner summarized in the text. For a fuller description of the pre- Wright Line state of affairs, see
Wright Line, 251 N.L.R.B. 1083, 1084-86 (1980), af dinpart, rev'd in part, 662 F.2d 899 (1st Cir.
1981).
73. Wright Line, 251 N.L.R.B. 1083, 1086-89 (1980), aff'd in part, rev'din part, 662 F.2d 899
(1st Cir. 1981).
74. Id
455
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business-related or how firmly held, would not have led the employer
to act as he did, and where the employer reaches the point of action
only because of his simultaneous distaste for the employee's union ac-
tivities, the proferred justifications are not merely pretextual. Still, it
seems implausible to refuse to recognize the employer's anti-union ani-
mus as the cause of his behavior. Still, because the General Counsel
would not, in such an instance, be able to prove that the employer had
"chosen" the bad motive and "rejected" the good one, the Bilen Shoe
formula would require that liability not attach.75 Under Wrig&t Line,
in contrast, no problem arises in these circumstances. So long as the
employer would not have acted as he did "but for" his anti-union senti-
ments, Wright Line is satisfied that a violation has been shown, regard-
less of any legitimate considerations that may have contributed to the
decision. 76
Equally preferable is Wright Line's treatment of the burden of
proof. Under Billen Shoe, the burden is on the General Counsel to
show that the employer does not have a legitimate explanation for his
behavior. Under Wright Line, the burden is on the employer to prove
that he does. The Wright Line scheme is justified by a number of con-
siderations. For one thing, in the true mixed motive case, the em-
ployer's business motivations are relevant as an affirmative defense, not
as evidence denying an element of the General Counsel's prima facie
case. This is so because, where it is established that anti-union animus
was a contributing factor in an employer's decision to engage in anti-
union conduct, the concurrent existence of a legitimate reason for such
behavior does not negate the existence of the unlawful motive. It
merely seeks tojustiy behavior consistent with that motive. 77 Since the
burden of proving an affirmative defense normally rests with the party
asserting the defense, Wright Line's allocation of the burden of proof
more closely conforms to traditional evidentiary schemes. 78
75. See id at 1087 (discussion of Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev.
Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977), to the effect that "efforts to determine what is the 'dominant' or 'pri-
mary' motive in a mixed motivation situation are usually unavailing").
76. 251 N.L.R.B. at 1089 n.14.
77. Id at 1084 n.5, 1088 n.ll.
78. The fact that an employer's legitimate business interests come into play as an affirmative
defense in mixed motive cases also is significant as establishing that the burden on the employer at
this point is a burden of persuasion, not merely an obligation to "come forward" with an accepta-
ble explanation for his conduct. Contra, NLRB v. Wright Line, 662 F.2d 899 (lst Cir. 1981). Cf.
Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981). The Wright Line decision is
rather clear on this point, Wright Line, 251 N.L.R.B. 1083, 1088 (1980), aff'd in part, rev'd in part,
662 F.2d 899 (1st Cir. 1981). This clarity is strongly supported by the language of NLRB v. Great
Dane Trailers, Inc., 388 U.S. 26, 34 (1967) ("The burden is upon the employer to establish that he
was motivated by legitimate objectives.") (emphasis added). This conclusion, of course, does not
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A second reason for placing this burden on the employer has to do
with the nature of the factual issue. Ultimately, the question of why the
employer engaged in the challenged conduct is a matter known only to
the employer. Moreover, whatever documentary material may exist in
support of the employer's position will be in the employer's control.
Under these circumstances, it is not unreasonable to require that the
employer be the one to articulate the legitimate reason for his behavior;
nor is it unreasonable to require him to be the one who initially mar-
shalls evidence bearing on his claim.' Indeed, precisely these considera-
tions were cited by the Supreme Court in Great Dane when it approved
a scheme of burdens strongly analogous to that set forth in Wright
Line:
[O]nce it has been proved [by the General Counsel] that the em-
ployer engaged in discriminatory conduct which could have ad-
versely affected employee rights to some extent, the burden is upon
the employer to establish that he was motivated by legitimate objec-
tives since proof of motivation is most accessible to him.7 9
Given these considerations, it is, perhaps, not surprising that
Wright Line has so far met little opposition in those circuits that had
previously held to some variant of the dominant motive test.80 What is
surprising is the Seventh Circuit's simple abdication to the Board on
this issue in Peavey. The "in part" standard previously adhered to in
this circuit reflects a very different estimation of the policies underlying
section 8(a)(3) from the attitude implicit in Wright Line. Since the val-
ues served by the "in part" test are central to the Act in general and
section 8(a)(3) in particular, enthusiastic applause for the Seventh Cir-
cuit's conversion may well be inappropriate.
The heart of Wright Line's argument rejecting the "in part" test is
relieve the General Counsel of his burden of persuasion on each of the elements of his prima facie
case. Thus, the General Counsel remains ultimately responsible for proving by a preponderance
of the evidence that anti-union animus was a motivating factor giving rise to the employer's con-
duct. 251 N.L.R.B. at 1088 n. 11. The presence or absence of alternative explanations for the
employer's conduct may be as relevant to proof of this element of the prima facie case as it is to
proof of the employer's affirmative defense, id. at 1088 n. 12; still, the burden of proving the prima
facie case remains on the General Counsel while the burden of proving the affirmative defense
remains on the employer.
79. NLRB v. Great Dane Trailers, Inc., 388 U.S. 26, 34 (1967) (emphasis in original). There
is also reason to believe that the legislative history supports this allocation of the burden of proof.
See Wright Line, 251 N.L.R.B. 1083, 1088 (1980), aff'd inpart, rev'd inpart, 662 F.2d 899 (1st Cir.
1981).
80. See, e.g., Statler Indus., Inc. v. NLRB, 644 F.2d 902 (1st Cir. 1981) (adopting Wright
Line); NLRB v. Permanent Label Corp., 657 F.2d 512 (3d Cir. 1981) (citing Wright Line approv-
ingly). But see NLRB v. Wright Line, 662 F.2d 899 (1st Cir. 1981) (endorsing the Board's liability
test and the scheme of shifting burdens, but rejecting the Board's analysis of the nature of the
employer's burden).
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given in a somewhat lengthy passage from the Supreme Court's Mt.
Healthy decision. The passage is quoted verbatim in the Wright Line
opinion. For this reason, and because of its centrality to Wright Line's
rationale, it is worth including the passage in its entirety here:
A rule of causation which focuses solely on whether protected con-
duct played a part, "substantial" or otherwise, in a decision not to
rehire, could place an employee in a better position as a result of the
exercise of constitutionally protected conduct than he would have oc-
cupied had he done nothing. The difficulty with the rule enunciated
by the District Court [an "in part" test] is that it would require rein-
statement in cases where a dramatic and perhaps abrasive incident is
inevitably on the minds of those responsible for the decision to re-
hire, and does indeed play a part in that decision-even if the same
decision would have been reached had the incident not occurred.
The constitutional principle at stake is sufficiently vindicated if such
an employee is placed in no worse position than if he had not en-
gaged in the conduct. A borderline or marginal candidate should not
have the employment question resolved against him because of con-
stitutionally protected conduct. But that same candidate ought not to
be able, by engaging in such conduct, to prevent his employer from
assessing his performance record and reaching a decision not to re-
hire on the basis of that record, simply because the protected conduct
makes the employer more certain of the correctness of its decision. 81
Certainly, the central factual premise of the At. Healthy argu-
ment-that an "in part" test places the employee who engages in pro-
tected activity in a better position than the employee who does not-is
correct. Moreover, on its face, this consideration makes application of
Mt. Healthy's reasoning particularly appealing in the context of section
8(a)(3) analysis. This is so for several reasons.
First, it is clear that the policy of section 8(a)(3) is one of even-
handedness towards the question of unionism. Thus, the section pro-
hibits both discrimination favoring and discrimination disfavoring
membership in a collective bargaining organization. Moreover, section
8(b)(2) of the Act prohibits a labor organization from "attempt[ing] to
cause an employer to discriminate against an employee in violation of
subsection 8(a)(3)."182 It would be anomalous indeed to enforce such a
statutory scheme by a standard of liability that inherently gave employ-
ees an incentive to engage in union activities while giving employers an
incentive to hesitate before dealing harshly with union activists. 83
81. Mt. Healthy City School Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 285-86 (1977).
82. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(2) (1976).
83. The point has been well put by the Second Circuit:
[lit is not the purpose of the statute to pressure employees into undertaking organiza-
tional efforts. Embodied in the statute is a principle of free choice. without a "but for"
test, we "could place an employee in a better position as a result" of his organizational
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Additionally, the fact that an "in part" test permits a finding of
anti-union animus even though the employee has given the employer
good cause for discipline, seemingly hamstrings the employer in his at-
tempt to maintain control over any unionized shop. The Supreme
Court has repeatedly emphasized that, in applying section 8(a)(3) in
mixed motive cases, the Board is obligated to strike a reasonable bal-
ance between the concerns of employee and employer:
As is not uncommon in human experience, such situations present a
complex of motives and preferring one motive to another is m reality
the far more delicate task, reflected in part in decisions of this Court,
of weighing the interests of employees in concerted activity against
the interest of the employer in operating his business in a particular
manner and of balancing in the light of the Act and its policy the
intended consequences upon employee rights against the business
ends to be served by the employer's conduct.84
The tension between this obligation and the "in part" test is palpable.85
Moreover, the tension is heightened by the fact that the Supreme
Court's recognition of the employer's need to manage his place of busi-
ness has been all but incorporated into the language of the Act by the
1947 amendment to the provisions of section 10(c): "No order of the
Board shall require the reinstatement of any individual as an employee
who has been suspended or discharged, or the payment to him of any
back pay, if such individual was suspended or discharged for cause."8 6
Finally, there is the Supreme Court's estimation that a "but for"
causation test is sufficient to "vindicate" the constitutional principle at
stake in mixed motive first amendment cases. Important though the
rights guaranteed under the NLRA may be, it would be difficult to ar-
gue that they rise to, let alone exceed, constitutional dimensions.
Hence, it seems to follow that a standard of liability which suffices to
protect employees in the exercise of their first amendment rights is
equally adequate to protect employees in the exercise of the rights
granted by the NLRA.8 7
efforts "than he would have occupied had he done nothing." Such a result would actu-
ally undermine the purpose of the statute by inducing employers to tread especially
ligtly when a union activist is involved--thereby violating the Act by encouraging pro-
union activity.
Waterbury Community Antenna, Inc. v. NLRB, 587 F.2d 90, 99 (2d Cir. 1978) (citation omitted).
84. NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp., 373 U.S. 221, 228-29 (1963), quoted in Wright Line, 251
N.L.R.B. 1083, 1089 (1980), eff'd in part, rev'd in part, 662 F.2d 899 (1st Cir. 1981). See also
NLRB v. Great Dane Trailers, Inc., 388 U.S. 26, 33-34 (1967) (referring to the Board's "duty" to
balance).
85. See Wright Line, 251 N.L.R.B. 1083, 1084 (1980), aff'd inpart, rev'dinpart, 662 F.2d 899
(1st Cir. 1981).
86. 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1976).
87. See Waterbury Community Antenna, Inc. v. NLRB, 587 F.2d 90, 99 (2d Cir. 1978).
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Still, persuasive as these arguments may appear, they all share a
common flaw: they all focus on the situation of the individual em-
ployee victimized by the employer's conduct without considering the
impact of that conduct on the interests of other workers. When an em-
ployer discriminates against an employee for having engaged in some
form of protected activity, such behavior has two undesirable conse-
quences. First, of course, such behavior effectively punishes an em-
ployee for exercising the rights that are granted him under the Act. To
tolerate such conduct would effectively emasculate the Act's protec-
tions, and that is why section 8(a)(1) makes it unlawful for an employer
to "interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the
rights guaranteed" under the Act. The arguments just recited make it
clear that a "but for" causality test is what is required to strike the
proper balance between this policy and the employer's interest in re-
taining control over his work place.
The second undesirable consequence that results when an em-
ployer discriminates against an employee for having engaged in some
form of protected activity is the message that is sent to other workers.
By purposefully discriminating against one union activist, the employer
puts his employees on notice that he will be willing to discriminate
against other union activists. Thus, not only is one individual punished
for having exercised the rights that Congress intended to guarantee
him, all employees are "chilled" against exercising those rights. It is,
perhaps, for this reason that section 8(a)(3) does not in express terms
address itself to discrimination that punishes individuals, but rather to
discrimination that generally "encourages or discourages membership
in a labor organization."8 8 While the "but for" test may well do an
adequate job of upholding the principles implicit in section 8(a)(l),
88. That § 8(a)(3) is meant to remedy the indirect, "chilling" effects of employer discrimina-
tion as well as its direct, punitive effects, is perhaps nowhere better illustrated than in Textile
Workers Union v. Darlington Mfg. Co., 380 U.S. 263 (1965). In Darlington the Board had found
as a matter of fact that the employer had liquidated its business rather than accept the union's
victory in a representation election. The Court held that if Darlington was an independent entity,
then despite the Board's express finding of anti-union animus, no violation of the Act could be
found. Id at 273-74. The Court contrasted a bona fide liquidation with a discriminatory lockout
or a "runaway shop" by noting that the latter forms of discrimination could be expected to "dis-
courage collective employee activities in the future," id at 271-72, whereas "a complete liquida-
tion of a business yields no such future benefit for the employer." Id at 272. Thus, although a
discriminatory liquidation constitutes punishment of employees for their having engaged in pro-
tected activities, the Court refused to find a violation of § 8(a)(3) because no chilling effect had
been shown sufficient to outweigh the employer's right to terminate his business. A different case
would arise, the Court held, if Darlington was more properly viewed as "an integral part" of its
parent corporation, Deering Milliken. Id at 274. This would be so precisely because of the chill
that could be expected to impede collective activity in other branches of the operation: "[A] dis-
criminatory partial closing may have repercussions on what remains of the business, affording the
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there is serious reason to doubt that it suffices to protect against the
chilling effect that anti-union discrimination may have on the ability of
other employees to exercise their rights.
The chilling message that is sent by anti-union discrimination does
not stem from the fact that the employer dislikes unionism, but from
the fact that he will act on this dislike. So long as the employer's anti-
union animus is sufficiently strong on its own to prompt his actions, the
threat to other union activists is implicit regardless of whatever other
legitimate motivations may have been present. The fact that the legiti-
mate considerations would, standing alone, have sufficed to bring about
the same result is irrelevant. Thus, a "but for" test would clearly toler-
ate anti-union discrimination in certain cases where one of the two pol-
icies at the heart of section 8(a)(3) would be disserved by such leniency.
This result would not occur under an "in part" standard of causation. 89
Moreover, this criticism of the "but for" test undercuts the persua-
siveness of the arguments previously recited in favor of the Wright Line
decision. While it is undoubtedly true that an "in part" test puts union
activists in a favored position, it is also true that this occurs only where
an employer has demonstrated his willingness to act upon his anti-
union sentiments. Failure to censure such an employer where he
would have behaved as he did even if he had had no legitimate grounds
for doing so would essentially insulate the conduct of an employer who
seized on the shortcomings of one union activist for the partial purpose
of inhibiting the activities of others. A rule that permits such conduct is
no more "evenhanded" than the "in part" test. Indeed, since one of the
avowed policies of the NLRA is a desire to redress the disparity in
employer leverage for discouraging the free exercise of. . .[protected]. . . rights among remain-
ing employees ...." Id at 274-75.
89. Of course, broadly construed, the "in part" test would make unlawful conduct that is not
wrongful even under this rationale. That is, the "in part" test can conceivably justify liability
where the unlawful motive is neither a necessary (but for) nor a sufficient (independent) cause of
the employer's conduct. Under these circumstances the Mt. Healthy and Wright Line criticisms
are telling, since a finding of an unfair labor practice would essentially protect the employees
against their employer's thoughts. Sensible application of the test, however, should suffice to
avoid such results. Where an unlawful motive is not a "but for" cause of the challenged conduct
and where it is not one of a number of independently sufficient causes of such conduct, it is
difficult to see how it is properly called a "cause" at all. While no circuit has expressly refined
application of the "in part" test in this manner, the Seventh Circuit may have been edging towards
such a solution prior to Peavey. Several cases this term required the Board to show that chal-
lenged conduct was caused in significant part by an unlawful motive. Eg., St. Luke's Memorial
Hosp., Inc. v. NLRB, 623 F.2d 1173 (7th Cir. 1980). Moreover, in several corollary cases, the
court held that no section 8(a)(3) violation could arise if the employer's anti-union motivation was
"de minimis." Pelton Casteel, Inc. v. NLRB, 627 F.2d 23, 30 (7th Cir. 1980); accord, NLRB v.
Pfizer, Inc., 629 F.2d 1272, 1275 (7th Cir. 1980).
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economic bargaining power between employer and employee, 90 the
lack of evenhandedness implicit in the "in part" test is probably more
consonant with the Act's purposes and structure than the lack of even-
handedness implicit in the "but for" test.
A similar argument can be made with respect to the conflict be-
tween the "in part" test and the employer's right to manage his work
place. The "in part" test does not entirely bar employers from firing or
disciplining incompetent employees. It merely does so when such con-
duct is intended not only to satisfy the requirements of shop discipline,
but also to impede other workers' abilities to exercise the rights granted
them by Congress. The employer, it must be emphasized, is not inno-
cent under these circumstances. The only reason his ability to control
his work force is limited at all is because of his willingness to act on his
desire to abridge the employees' rights. If he were willing to live with
the Act's protections, no issue would arise. Still, as Mt. Healthy and
Wright Line point out, the incompetent employee is an equally unsym-
pathetic character. He has, for whatever reason, demonstrated that he
is deserving of some sort of sanction. Consequently, if the incompetent
employee's punishment were merely a matter between him and the em-
ployer, there would be little reason to be particularly sympathetic to
either party, and the Act's policy recognizing the employer's right to
maintain shop discipline would argue strongly for a "but for" standard.
This calculus, however, is altered when rights of other parties are also
at issue. The other employees in the shop, employees who have done
nothing to warrant punishment, face a clear, if implicit, threat where
the employer has acted in part for the purpose of chilling unionism.
Though the employer is still hampered in his ability to control the work
place by the "in part" test, as between himself and the innocent em-
ployees it is unarguable that he is the wrongdoer and that he, not they,
should suffer the detriment of his conduct. In short, when all of the
policies implicit in section 8(a)(3) are considered, the Board's obliga-
tion to balance the interests of employer and employee argues against
Wright Line and in favor of the "in part" test.9'
This leaves the contention that the employee rights protected by
the NLRA should not be given any greater protection than the protec-
90. 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1976).
91. The language of § 10(c) cited above, see text accompanying note 86 supra, is consistent
with this position. That section merely assures that employers will be permitted to discharge or
suspend employees "for cause." The issue in mixed motive cases is precisely whether an employee
has been disciplined "for cause" or for having engaged in protected activities. The "in part" and
the "but for" tests, as tests of causation, are simply alternative ways of resolving this question.
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tions established by Mt. Healthy safeguarding the employee rights
guaranteed by the first amendment. This argument is particularly tell-
ing since first amendment cases often evaluate the indirect chilling ef-
fect of a defendant's conduct and since arguments based on that effect
are, under certain circumstances, properly asserted by plaintiffs on be-
half of absent third parties. 92 The problem with this argument is that
M. Healthy simply does not address the chilling effect issue. The only
issue posed in the Mt. Healthy case was whether or not the injury to
that plaintiff was sufficient to state a cause of action under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 and the first and fourteenth amendments. The opinion is simply
silent as to whether a claim could have been stated on the basis of the
injury to the defendant school district's other employees. For the rea-
sons discussed above, there are substantial grounds for believing that
the Court might have reached a different conclusion had this latter in-
jury been at issue. Thus, while the "but for" test sufficiently vindicates
the first amendment rights of employees who are punished for having
exercised those rights, M. Healthy does not establish that this test of
causation sufficiently vindicates the first amendment rights of other em-
ployees whose liberty may be chilled by the employer's conduct.
Therefore, the fact that rights guaranteed under the NLRA do not de-
serve any greater protections than the rights guaranteed by the Consti-
tution does not, by reason of the Mt. Healthy decision, mandate a "but
for" test in mixed motive labor cases.
In short, none of the arguments that can be cited in support of the
Wright Line decision ultimately offer a persuasive justification for
adopting a "but for" test of causation in mixed motive cases. More-
over, by ignoring the chilling effect that anti-union discrimination may
have on employees not directly victimized by such discrimination, this
test actually undermines the ability of section 8(a)(3) to serve the pur-
poses for which it was drafted. Accordingly, the Seventh Circuit's ab-
rupt conversion to the "but for" test in Peavey must be viewed as a
move of dubious validity.
THE COMMON LAW OF EMPLOYMENT: TERMINABLE
AT WILL CONTRACTS
While the traditional focus of labor law practice has been the vari-
ous federal regulatory schemes, the last several years have witnessed a
not-so-quiet revolution in the common law of employment. To a re-
markable degree, the alpha and the omega of the common law of em-
92. See, e.g., Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 12-13 (1973), and cases cited therein.
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ployment has been the proposition that an employment contract of
indefinite duration is terminable at the will of either party.93 Beginning
in the mid-1960's, however, this well-established rule has been eroded
from two directions. On the one hand, a number of jurisdictions have
begun to hold-sometimes as a matter of tort law, sometimes as a mat-
ter of contract law-that even at will employees cannot be fired when
their discharge would conflict with well-established principles of public
policy.94 Supplementing these decisions is a line of cases recognizing,
as a principle of contract law, that, under certain circumstances, even
employment contracts of indefinite duration cannot be terminated ex-
cept for good cause.95
In Ryan v. JC. Penney Co. ,96 the Seventh Circuit was asked to
consider the viability of this latter line of attack on the at will rule as a
matter of Indiana law. Viewing itself as bound by the Erie doctrine 97
to a conservative application of the Indiana precedent, the court re-
fused to hold the defendant employer to a good cause standard in con-
nection with the discharge of an employee hired for an indefinite term.
Regardless of its validity as an application of the Erie doctrine, Ryan is
probably not a good prognostication of future developments in the Sev-
enth Circuit jurisdictions. Accordingly, a careful analysis of the rele-
vant state law may provide a better guide for future Seventh Circuit
practice than the Ryan decision itself.
The plaintiff in Ryan had alleged that, at the time she was hired,
the defendant had promised that she would be discharged only for just
cause. On the defendant's motion for summary judgment, the district
court held that a question of fact existed as to whether such a promise
had been made and breached, and that breach of such a promise would
be actionable as a breach of contract. 98 The matter was certified for
interlocutory appeal, and the Seventh Circuit, relying principally on
the decision of the Indiana Appellate Court in Shaw v. S.S. Kresge
93. E.g., Buian v. J.L. Jacobs & Co., 428 F.2d 531 (7th Cir. 1970) (relying on Illinois law);
Shaw v. S.S. Kresge Co., 167 Ind. App. 1, 328 N.E.2d 775 (1975); Forrer v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.,
36 Wis. 2d 388, 153 N.W.2d 587 (1967).
94. This approach has been adopted by two of the Seventh Circuit jurisdictions. Palmateer v.
International Harvester Co., 85 Ill. 2d 124, 421 N.E.2d 876 (1981); Frampton v. Central Ind. Gas
Co., 260 Ind. 249, 297 N.E.2d 425 (1973).
95. See, e.g., Cleary v. American Airlines, 111 Cal. App. 3d 443, 168 Cal. Rptr. 722 (1980);
Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Mich., 408 Mich. 579, 292 N.W.2d 880 (1980). See
generaly Comment, Job Securityfor the At W11 Employee- Contractual Right ofDischargefor
Cause, 57 CHI. KENT L. REv. 697 (1981); Comment, implied Contract Rights to Job Security, 26
STAN. L. REv. 335 (1974).
96. 627 F.2d 836 (7th Cir. 1980).
97. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
98. Ryan v. Upchurch, 474 F. Supp. 211 (S.D. Ind. 1979).
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Co. ,99 reversed. The Seventh Circuit found that Indiana law will not
enforce a promise of job security where the contract of employment is
for an indefinite term and where there is no independent considera-
tion-that is, consideration beyond the mere rendition of services-to
support the promise.
As the authorities cited and discussed in Ryan make clear, this is
not a particularly unusual statement of the law of employment con-
tracts. Still, it is a statement which has been subject to increasing chal-
lenge. The leading case rejecting the orthodox view as to the
enforceability of promises of job security is Toussaint v. Blue Cross &
Blue Shield of Michigan,i°° a recent decision of the Supreme Court of
Michigan. In Toussaint, as well as in its companion case, Ebling v.
Masco, Inc., the jury found that the plaintiff had expressly inquired
about the security of the job for which he was being hired. In both
cases the plaintiff was assured that he would remain with the employer
so long as he performed his work satisfactorily. Indeed, in Toussaint,
this oral reassurance was underlined by reference to the employer's
policy manual, a document which was handed to the employee in re-
sponse to his question and which expressly provided that termination
would only be for cause.' 0 Finally, in both cases, the evidence clearly
showed that this promise of job security was relied upon by the plaintiff
in deciding to accept the employment.
The bedrock principle on which the Toussaint opinion is built is
that of most contract law: the freedom of contract. The court pointed
out that to hold that a contract of indefinite duration must always be
terminable at will is to deprive the parties of the right to strike an alter-
native bargain. Hence, unless such contracts are contrary to public pol-
icy or inherently in violation of some other canon of contract doctrine,
the law's preference for terminable at will agreements should most
properly be viewed as a sort of presumption that seeks to effect the
actual desires of the parties:
The "rule" is useful, however, as a rule of construction. Because
the parties began with complete freedom, the court will presume that
they intended to obligate themselves to a relationship at will.
To the extent that courts have seen the rule as one of substantive
99. 167 Ind. App. 1, 328 N.E.2d 775 (1975).
100. 408 Mich. 579, 292 N.W.2d 880 (1980). Two cases, Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield
of Mich., 79 Mich. App. 429, 262 N.W.2d 848 (1978), and Ebling v. Masco Corp., 79 Mich. App.
531, 261 N.W.2d 74 (1974), were consolidated on appeal.
101. The only other factual difference between the cases was that Ebling was promised a stock
option based on the longevity of his service. By the terms of his contract he was denied his right to
exercise this option because he was dismissed before having served three years with Masco.
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law rather than construction, they have misapplied language and
principles found in earlier cases where the courts were merely at-
tempting to discover and implement the intent of the parties.'0 2
From this recognition, it is but a short step to Toussaint's ultimate hold-
ing that the presumption embodied in the at will rule can be overcome
by evidence of the parties' actual intent.
The defendants in Toussaint argued against this conclusion by as-
serting that, in fact, an overarching principle of contract law does
render promises of job security inherently unenforceable. The prob-
lem, according to the defendants, is that an employer who has prom-
ised to terminate only for cause is obligated to retain an employee's
services so long as the employee desires, while the employee remains
free to terminate at will. This discrepancy, it was said, renders such
promises void for want of mutuality, because one party can "enforce"
the promise, but not the other. Not surprisingly, the Toussaint court
found this argument unpersuasive. "The enforceability of a contract,"
the court wrote, "depends on consideration and not mutuality of
obligation." 0 3
While the court essentially let the matter rest on this observation, it
is clear that this was the proper resolution of the issue. There is no
reason why a promise of job security is not supported by adequate con-
sideration where the employee merely accepts a job offer including
such a promise by beginning work. An employment contract is essen-
tially unilateral in nature. That is, the employer invites the perform-
ance of certain services by the employee by promising, for example, to
compensate him at a certain rate, promising to supply a safe and clean
working environment, promising to demand performance only at cer-
tain hours and so forth. It is the employer's choice as to what bundle of
promises he will offer as an incentive to attract the services of the em-
ployee. Hence, it is his choice as to what promises will be adequately
supported by the bargained for consideration of the employee's work.
A promise that the employee will not be discharged except for cause is
as much a legitimate inducement in this regard as is a promise of four
weeks of vacation or six hours a week of overtime. Consequently,
when the employee begins performance, a contract including the em-
ployer's promise of job security is formed just as surely as if the sole
promise had related to wages.1o4 Moreover, an employment contract
102. 408 Mich. at 600, 292 N.W.2d at 885.
103. Id
104. IA A. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTs § 152, especially at 16 n.1 1.20 (1963); RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 75 & Comment b (1981).
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containing a promise of job security is no less mutually enforceable
than any other employment contract. An employer hires an employee
to perform a certain service, under certain conditions. When the em-
ployee fails to perform as promised, the employer may discharge him.
The fact that the employee's right of termination is broader than the
employer's does not mean that a mutual right of termination does not
exist.
While the Toussaint opinion seems to make unarguable good
sense, the Seventh Circuit's Ryan decision makes it clear that Toussaint
does not accurately state the law as it currently exists in this jurisdic-
tion. The question is whether Toussaint or Ryan is the more likely har-
binger of future Seventh Circuit rulings. In order to answer this
question, it is necessary to consider each of the Seventh Circuit juris-
dictions in turn.
Indiana
Ryan's construction of Indiana law turned heavily on its reading
of the Indiana Appellate Court's decision in Shaw v. S.S. Kresge Co. 105
In Shaw, the plaintiff alleged that her employer's promise of job secur-
ity could be found in its employee handbook. The handbook distin-
guished between "temporary" employees, who worked for "an
indeterminate period of time," and "permanent" employees like the
plaintiff. Moreover, the handbook specified that permanent employees
would only be discharged after having received three warning slips and
after being given an opportunity to argue their case before a grievance
committee. Finally, the handbook listed certain specified grounds for
termination. Plaintiff was allegedly discharged for "chronic absentee-
ism and tardiness," but she had not been given any warning slips and
was never permitted to argue her case to the grievance committee. The
appellate court sustained the lower court's dismissal of the complaint
essentially on mutuality grounds:
105. 167 Ind. App. 1, 328 N.E.2d 775 (1975). The Ryan court cited several other decisions in
support of its holding. However, these cases either merely contained earlier statements of Shaw's
reasoning, e.g., Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Guignet, 112 Ind. App. 661, 45 N.E.2d 337 (1942) (en
banc), or they adopted that decision's holding, McQueeney v. Glenn, 400 N.E.2d 806 (Ind. Ct.
App. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1125 (1981), or they related to promises of "permanent" employ-
ment where no specific mention was made to the effect that termination would only be for cause.
Haag v. International Tel. & Tel. Corp., 342 F.2d 566 (7th Cir. 1965); Davis v. Davis, 197 Ind. 386,
151 N.E. 134 (1926); Speeder Cycle Co. v. Teeters, 18 Ind. App. 474, 48 N.E. 595 (1897). In these
latter cases, the courts held, sensibly enough, that a promise of "permanent" employment should
not be construed literally, and that, absent special circumstances suggestive to the contrary, such
contracts should be viewed as being of indefinite duration. Accord, IA A. CORBIN, CORBIN ON
CONTRACTS § 152 (1963); 3A A. CORBIN, CoRBIN ON CONTRACTS § 684 (1960).
CHICAGO KENT LAW REVIEW
[A]ssuming, arguendo, that the handbook relied upon by appellant
constituted a part of the contract, in the absence of a promise on the
part of the employer that the employment should continue for a pe-
riod of time that is either definite or capable of determination the
employment relationship is terminable at will. . . .There being no
binding promise on the part of the employee that he would continue
in the employment, it must also be regarded as terminable at his dis-
cretion as well. For want of mutuality of obligation or consideration,
such a contract would be unenforceable in respect of that which re-
mains executory.' °6
While it cannot be disputed that Shaw represents the most recent word
of the Indiana courts on the subject, and while the holding in Shaw has
been cited approvingly in at least one subsequent decision, 0 7 there is
strong reason for believing that Shaw was wrongly decided.
As was pointed out by the Ryan district court, the mutuality doc-
trine on which Shaw rests has been repudiated in other Indiana cases.
In Seco Chemicals, Inc. v. Stewart,08 the plaintiff was hired under a
written contract which stated that the term of employment was twenty-
five months. When the employer refused to honor this contract, the
employee sued. The employer argued that, since the employee was free
to leave his employment at any time whereas he (the employer) could
not terminate for a period of twenty-five months, the contract was void
for lack of mutuality. The court rejected this argument, effectively re-
jecting along with it the whole mutuality doctrine: "[T]he Indiana rule
[is] that there is no mutuality deficiency where one party to an agree-
ment acts upon the promises of the other party and performs his part of
the agreement-because the other party becomes bound by that per-
formance."' 9 On the basis of this reasoning there was no deficiency in
the Shaw case, which rests on the mutuality doctrine, or, for that mat-
ter, in Ryan, which rests on Shaw.
Still, because the district court had sustained the plaintiff's com-
plaint largely on the logic of Seco, the Seventh Circuit was fully aware
of that ruling in Ryan. Thus, it is not surprising that, although the
Ryan opinion ultimately rests on Erie grounds,"10 the decision also
seeks to distinguish the argument of Seco. This attempted distinction is
probably unwarranted. The Seventh Circuit emphasized the fact that
Seco involved an employment contract of definite duration; that is, the
106. 167 Ind. App. at 7, 328 N.E.2d at 779 (citations omitted).
107. McQueeney v. Glenn, 400 N.E.2d 806 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1125
(1981).
108. 169 Ind. App. 624, 349 N.E.2d 733 (1976).
109. Id. at 632, 349 N.E.2d at 738.
110. 627 F.2d at 838.
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sort of contract that even Shaw would recognize as terminable only for
cause. While true insofar as it goes, this observation ignores the fact
that the issue in Seco, as in Shaw, was whether or not a contract was
enforceable where the employee had the right to terminate at will, but
the employer did not. Shaw holds that this lack of mirror image con-
sideration destroys "mutuality." Seco holds to the contrary. In Shaw,
the asymmetry arose because the employee could terminate at will but
the employer could terminate only for good cause. In Seco, the asym-
metry arose because that employee could terminate at will at any time
but the employer could terminate at will only at the end of twenty-five
months. There is no reason suggested in either Shaw, Seco or Ryan
why one sort of asymmetry should destroy the contract but the other
should not. Accordingly, if Seco states the better rule of law-and, for
the reasons given above it clearly does-then Shaw was wrongly de-
cided."' l Thus, the greater likelihood is that future Indiana decisions
will reject the mutuality doctrine, and enforce bargained-for promises
of job security.
Wisconsin
While the courts of Wisconsin have not directly decided whether
to recognize and enforce bargained-for promises of job security, they
have laid much of the groundwork from which the Toussaint court ap-
proved such agreements. In Forrer v. Sears Roebuck & Co.,112 the
plaintiff had initially resigned his job with the defendant for health rea-
sons and taken up farming. The defendant solicited the .plaintiff to re-
turn to his old position and the plaintiff, in partial reliance on the
defendant's promise of permanent employment, sold his farm and
stock and accepted the offer. When the plaintiff was discharged, alleg-
edly without cause, he brought suit. The court found that the defend-
111. Ryan also sought to reinforce the distinction between Shaw and Seco by citation to
Corbin's treatise on contracts. IA A. CORBIN, CoRIaN ON CorrAc'rs § 152, at 13-17 (1963). In
a passage quoted by both Ryan and Seco and cited by Shaw, Corbin states:
[Ilf the employer made a promise, either express or implied, not only to pay for the
service but also that the employment should continue for a period of time that is either
definite or capable of being determined, that employment is not terminable by him "at
will" after the employee has begun or rendered some of the requested service ....
Id at 14. Ryan apparently infers from this language that any employment contract not definite as
to duration is, ipsofacto, unenforceable. The treatise, however, flatly disowns other judicial at-
tempts to draw such an inference from its teachings, see id at 15-17 & 16 n. 1.20. Moreover, in
other sections, it acknowledges that "permanent" employment contracts are not necessarily termi-
nable at will, 3A A. CORBIN, CoRBIN ON CONTRACTS § 684, at 228 (1960), and that a promise to
retain an employee so long as his work is satisfactory may be enforced so long as there is adequate
consideration. Id at 229.
112. 36 Wis. 2d 388, 153 N.W.2d 587 (1967).
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ant's promise of permanent employment was enforceable on an
estoppel theory, but that permanent employment was the same thing as
employment at will and that this much had been given. 1 3
The Wisconsin court reached the conclusion that it did because,
like the Toussaint court, it viewed the at will rule as a rule of construc-
tion which did not need to be overridden on the facts of the case before
it:
Generally speaking, a contract for permanent employment, for
life employment, or for other terms purporting permanent employ-
ment, where the employee furnishes no consideration additional to
the services incident to the employment, amounts to an indefinite
general hiring terminable at the will of either party, and a discharge
without cause does not constitute a breach of such a contract justify-
ing recovery of damages. . . Although not absolute, the above
stated rule appears to be in the nature of a strong presumption in
favor of a contract terminable at will unless the terms of the contract
or other circumstances clearly manifest the parties' intent to bind
each other. 114
The not-so-subtle implication of this view of the at will doctrine is that
clear evidence of a contrary intent will override the "strong
presumption."
Thus, it is not surprising that, when the facts of the case have so
dictated, the Wisconsin Supreme Court has not hesitated to set the at
will rule aside. In Smith v. Beloit Corp.,115 for example, the court was
faced with a case in which the plaintiff was induced to move from Ca-
nada in reliance on the defendant's promise of a job. The parties did
not specifically agree to any term of employment, but the plaintiff was
told that he would "be given this period of one year before I would be
capable . . . of fully performing" the job. Thus, while the court did
hold, relying on Forrer, that there was no enforceable promise of per-
manent employment, and hence, no permanent good cause covenant, it
also held that there was an implicit promise of employment for a pe-
riod of one year, and that this promise could not be terminated at will.
113. Id at 395, 153 N.W.2d at 589.
114. Id at 395, 153 N.W.2d at 589-90. Interestingly, reading Forrer generously, the court's
treatment of the at will rule as a sort of evidentiary presumption appears to explain its adherence
to the "separate consideration" exception. That is, where an employer expects to receive consider-
ation above and beyond the services to be rendered, it is fair to assume that he is offering terms of
employment above and beyond the traditional at will relationship. As the Forrer court points out,
however, this alteration in the employer's presumed intent is only plausible where the additional
consideration is in the nature of a benefit to the employer. There is no reason to alter one's
presumptions about the employer's intent on the basis of a detriment to the employee. See id at
395, 153 N.W.2d at 590.
115. 40 Wis. 2d 550, 162 N.W.2d 585 (1968).
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Similarly, in Matthew v. American Family Mutual Insurance Co. ,116 the
employment contract was silent as to both duration and grounds for
termination. Because, however, the contract specified a particular
method of termination (ninety-day notice), the court found that the
contract was not terminable at will, but only in conformity with the
specified procedures." 7
Finally, and most strikingly, there is the case of Krug v. Flambeau
Plastics Corp. 118 In Krug the written agency contract specified that the
relationship could be terminated by either party after the provision of
ninety-days notice, and that the employer would retain plaintiff as its
sales representative so long as his total sales volume maintained a cer-
tain minimum quarterly level. The employer argued that the sales vol-
ume clause made the contract a contract of indefinite duration, and
hence, terminable at will. The employee, of course, disagreed. The
court framed the question before it as one of whether the presumption
embodied in the at will rule should be permitted to displace the express
contractual language specifying the acceptable grounds for termina-
tion: "Does the restriction on the right of the defendant corporation to
terminate, except for good cause, make this either a contract for perma-
nent employment or one for an unspecified or indefinite term that
thereby becomes terminable at will of either party?""l 9 The court re-
cited the rule in Forrer as controlling in the case before it and, accord-
ingly, found that the parties' clearly manifested intent made the
presumption embodied in the at will rule patently inappropriate:
Here the defendant corporation first proposed and then agreed to a
contractual assurance to its sales representative that if he built up the
business to a certain level and maintained that quota of sales it
would not exercise its right to terminate on ninety-day notice. To
hold that such assurance converted the agreement into an indefinite
contract terminable at will of either party, would be contrary to the
clear intent of both parties and would make the contractual provision
worse than meaningless by substituting termination at will for even a
ninety-day notice of cancellation. Such construction is not here
required. 120
116. 54 Wis. 2d 336, 195 N.W.2d 611 (1972).
117. Id at 341, 159 N.W.2d at 613. To the same effect, see Goffv. Massachusetts Prospective
Ass'n, 46 Wis. 2d 712, 176 N.W.2d 576 (1970).
118. 62 Wis. 2d 141, 214 N.W.2d 281 (1974).
119. Id at 148, 214 N.W.2d at 284.
120. Id at 150-51, 214 N.W.2d at 285. The court also noted, id at 150, 214 N.W.2d at 285-86,
that lack of mutuality was not a problem. This holding, however, is not strictly applicable to the
pure Toussaint or Ryan-type case. The distinction is that in Toussaint and Shaw the promise of
job security was part of a unilateral contract where the only consideration invited in exchange for
the employer's promise is the employee's performance of the specified services. In Krug, however,
the contract was bilateral because the defendant's promises as to the terms of employment were
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In short, because it views the at will rule as a principle of construc-
tion rather than a doctrine of substantive law, the Wisconsin Supreme
Court has had little trouble in limiting the rule's use. Indeed, it has
held that the rule does not apply to numerous contracts of employment,
even where such contracts are not facially drawn to endure for a speci-
fied term, and even though the employer's promise to limit his right of
termination is not supported by consideration beyond the provision of
the bargained-for services. Thus, like Toussaint, Wisconsin law seems
to put the actual intent of the parties at a premium and it seems likely
that Wisconsin courts will be willing to enforce bargained-for promises
of job security.
Illinois
In Illinois, the proposition that an employment contract of perma-
nent or indefinite duration is terminable at will has tended to be offered
without any supporting rationale, as a kind of ipse dixit. While some
Seventh Circuit cases have suggested that the basis for the rule is the
mutuality problem discussed above,' 2' the Illinois cases themselves are
largely free of such arguments. 22 Accordingly, the scope of the Illinois
at will rule is best inferred from the cases where the courts have de-
clined to apply it.
Generally speaking, Illinois courts have refused to treat facially
indefinite employment contracts as terminable at will where the evi-
dence indicates that the parties intended something different. Thus, for
example, where the evidence warrants it, the Illinois courts will find
that facially indefinite employment contracts were, in fact, intended to
supported both by Krug's actual rendition of services and by several reciprocal promises, specifi-
cally, a non-competition agreement, and a promise to work exclusively for Flambeau should
Krug's sales reach a certain level. The court found that, because of these reciprocal promises, the
asymmetric rights of termination did not destroy the contract:
A contract does not lack mutuality "merely because every obligation of one party is not
met by equivalent counter obligation of the other party." Mutuality of obligation means
sufficient consideration so that one promise of one party to a bilateral contract may sup-
port one or more promises of the other party.
Id at 151, 214 N.W.2d at 285-86 (citations omitted).
121. See, e.g., Buian v. J.L. Jacobs & Co., 428 F.2d 531, 533 (7th Cir. 1970); Meadows v.
Radio Indus., Inc., 222 F.2d 347, 348 (7th Cir. 1955).
122. Indeed, at least some of them tacitly recognize that the "problem" of mutuality is really
only a problem of the adequacy of consideration. Eg., Carter v. Kaskaskia Community Action
Agency, 24 I11. App. 3d 1056, 1059, 322 N.E.2d 574, 576 (1974). Moreover, it is striking that the
principal Illinois case cited by the Seventh Circuit in Meadows v. Radio Indus., Inc., 222 F.2d 347
(7th Cir. 1955), held a "permanent" contract of employment to be terminable at will not for want
of mutuality, but because the term "permanent" was too indefinite to permit any other construc-
tion. See Davis v. Fidelity Fire Ins. Co., 208 Ill. 375, 385, 70 N.E. 359, 363 (1904).
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have a specifiable duration.123 Moreover, several Illinois courts have
indicated that an employer will not be permitted to use his right of
termination at will to render other aspects of the employment con-
tract-most notably promised pension benefits and service bonuses-
illusory. 24 Finally, in a case remarkably similar to Wisconsin's Krug
decision, one Illinois appellate court has held that an otherwise indefi-
nite employment contract will not be terminable at will if a specific
ground for discharge is stated.
In Donahue v. Rockford Showcase & Fixture Co., 125 the initial let-
ter concerning a salesman's employment status indicated that the em-
ployment relationship would not be terminable except by the mutual
consent of both parties. A subsequent letter, however, stated that the
salesman would be terminated in the event that his sales fell below
$25,000 a year. When the salesman was fired despite having met this
minimum sales requirement, he brought suit. The appellate court ini-
tially affirmed the circuit court's dismissal of the complaint on the
grounds that the mutual consent requirement was tantamount to a
promise of permanent employment, and that the contract was therefore
so indefinite as to be terminable at will. On rehearing, however, the
court reversed its position, reasoning that to do otherwise would effec-
tively defeat the parties' intent:
[Because) both letters provided for termination by mutual consent,
the contract would have been for an indefinite duration and thus ter-
minable at will absent the condition added in the second letter.
However, the additional provision did amount to the setting of a con-
dition, upon the happening of which, the contract would have been
terminated. The contract was not ambiguous in its expression of du-
ration and, therefore, not subject to construction .... In legal effect,
the contract specified a definite duration which prevented the de-
fendant from terminating at will. 126
All of these cases emphasize the impact of an at will right of termi-
nation on the parties' intended agreement. In each case, the at will rule
yields to the demands of the negotiated bargain. Given this willingness
123. E.g., Grauer v. Valve & Primer Corp., 47 Ill. App. 3d 152, 361 N.E.2d 863 (1977) (imply-
ing intent to hire for one year from the fact that employee's salary was to be figured on the basis of
annual shipments). The Seventh Circuit, apparently much troubled by the mutuality "problem,"
has indicated a much greater, and probably inappropriate, hesitancy to infer such an intent. See
Buian v. J.L. Jacobs & Co., 428 F.2d 531 (7th Cir. 1970).
124. E.g., Criscione v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 66 Ill. App. 3d 664, 669, 384 N.E.2d 91, 94
(1978); Stevenson v. ITT Harper, Inc., 51 Ill. App. 3d 568, 573, 366 N.E.2d 561, 567 (1977). Both
cases recognized that such bad faith conduct would be improper, but held that the pleadings did
not state a claim.
125. 87 Ill. App. 2d 47, 230 N.E.2d 278 (1967).
126. Id at 54, 230 N.E.2d at 281-82.
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to abandon the at will rule where there is evidence of contrary intent, it
seems highly likely that Ryan would have come out differently had it
been decided under Illinois law. Thus, as in Michigan, Wisconsin and
arguably Indiana, one may realistically expect that the Illinois courts
will view promises of job security as simply one promise among many
made by the employer to prospective employees. The at will rule in
Illinois, therefore, can safely be considered a rule of construction and
not a rule of substantive law.
Characterizing the Illinois at will rule in this way makes it likely
that Illinois courts would be willing to enforce a bargained-for promise
of job security, a prediction supported by two relatively recent Illinois
cases dealing with the enforceability of statements made in an em-
ployer's policy manual. In Carter v. Kaskaskia Community Action
Agency, 27 the plaintiff was the former manpower director of a commu-
nity anti-poverty program who had been hired for an indefinite term.
He contended that his discharge from this position was unlawful be-
cause it contravened the procedures for discharge set forth in the em-
ployer's personnel manual. The defendant, not surprisingly, argued
that the provisions of the manual were not contractually binding and
that the plaintiff was an at will employee. In overturning the circuit
court's bench verdict in favor of the defendant, the appellate court
noted that the procedures described in the policy manual had only been
initiated after negotiations between the agency's executive director and
the employees, including the plaintiff. Moreover, the court held that
the plaintiff's decision to continue with the agency in the wake of the
changes embodied in the manual provided sufficient consideration to
support a binding modification of the employment contract:
It has been determined that, when the term of employment is at the
will of the parties, continuing to work not only constitutes assent but
also consideration for any modification of the original contract.
Thus, it appears that the plaintiff not only assented to a modification
of his contract, but he provided sufficient consideration for that mod-
ification, thus creating mutuality of obligation. 128
In short, the Carter case directly holds that a terminable at will em-
ployee may bargain for an enforceable promise of job security even
when the only consideration supporting the promise is the continued
performance of the services he was hired to perform.
The emphasis this decision places on the element of bargain in
determining the enforceability of a promise of job security is under-
127. 24 II1. App. 3d 1056, 322 N.E.2d 574 (1974).
128. Id at 1059, 322 N.E.2d at 576 (citations omitted).
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lined by the subsequent case of Sargent v. Illinois Institute of Technol-
ogy. 129 Sargent was a security guard at IIT who was dismissed from
his job, supposedly for his conduct in connection with the detention of
an IIT student. Sargent argued that, in fact, he was discharged by his
supervisor in retaliation for having accused the supervisor of appropri-
ating university property for his personal use. Sargent contended that
the university's employment manual specified the infractions that
would justify dismissal; that dismissal was improper except for these
reasons; and that, therefore, his retaliatory discharge was improper.
The court was unpersuaded. It noted that the employment manual pre-
dated Sargent's arrival at the school. Additionally, there is nothing in
the opinion to suggest that the issue of job security was discussed by
Sargent at the time of his hiring. Hence, the court concluded that the
provisions of the manual were not bargained for as part of Sargent's
employment contract, and therefore, any promise of job security im-
plicit in the manual was unenforceable. Moreover, the court dist-
inguished Sargent from Carter on precisely this ground, emphasizing
the absence of those features of the earlier case that had made the pro-
visioni of the personnel manual part of an enforceable, negotiated bar-
gain rather than a mere unilateral statement of intent. 30 While the
court's analysis of the bargain struck between Sargent and the univer-
sity might be open to question,' 3 1 the crucial fact about the case, for the
129. 78 Ill. App. 3d 117, 397 N.E.2d 443 (1979).
130. Accord, Johnson v. National Beef Packing Co., 220 Kan. 52, 551 P.2d 779 (1976).
131. There are two recent cases which, on somewhat different theories, have held contrary to
Sargent on this point. In Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Mich., 408 Mich. 579, 292
N.W.2d 880 (1980), the majority held that the plaintiff would have been able to enforce the
promises made in the employer's personnel manual even if they had not been a subject of explicit
negotiation. Id at 613, 292 N.W.2d at 892. The court referred to a series of its previous decisions
in which unilateral promises of severance pay, pensions, bonuses and the like had been enforced.
Id at 615-18, 292 N.W.2d at 893-94. The opinion argued that such promises, though unilateral,
are not gratuitous since they are intended to secure "an orderly, cooperative and loyal work
force." Id at 613, 292 N.W.2d at 892. Moreover, by their publication, the opinion added, such
promises create a "legitimate expectation" of fulfillment. Id at 619, 292 N.W.2d at 895.
This argument is dubious. The unilateral statements made in a policy manual are just that:
unilateral. Indeed, as Toussaint itself recognizes, such policy statements are subject to unilateral
amendment by the employer. Id at 613, 292 N.W.2d at 892. How such promises can be both
contractually binding and subject to unilateral alteration is not explained. Moreover, where such
promises are not the product of negotiation it is difficult to understand what, if any, meeting of the
minds has occurred. Finally, the mere fact that the employer derives some ultimate benefit from
such promises does not differentiate them from most other gratuities. The question for the law of
contract is whether this benefit was bargainedfor in exchange for the promise. Put another way,
the Toussaint opinion seems to suggest that the enforceability of the provisions of a policy manual
turns on whether or not any benefit actually flows from them to the promisor. Thus, carried to its
logical conclusion, Toussaint would dictate that employers with "orderly, cooperative and loyal"
work forces would be contractually bound to adhere to their personnel policies, but those with
insubordinate, balky and traitorous work forces would not.
At best Toussaint might be read as justifying such promises on an estoppel theory. Certainly
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purposes of the issue raised by Ryan is that the analysis did proceed as
an analysis of the bargain and that the court did not foreclose reference
to the intent of the parties by invocation of the doctrine of mutuality.
In short, as with the other Seventh Circuit jurisdictions, it is likely that
Illinois courts will view the at will doctrine as a presumption which can
be overridden by clear contrary evidence of the parties' intent.
CONCLUSION
In its 1980-81 term, the Seventh Circuit rendered significant deci-
sions in two developing areas of labor law. In considering the issue of
an employer's "mixed motive" conduct under section 8(a)(3) of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act, the court adopted the Board's recently ar-
ticulated Wright Line test. In doing so, the Seventh Circuit overruled a
the cases dealing with pensions and bonuses can be fit into this mold. But a promissory estoppel
will only arise where, inter alia, the promisee has relied to his detriment on the promise he is
seeking to enforce. RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 90 (1932). Where an employee remains in
service for an extended period of time and is rewarded for such loyalty with a pension or bonus, it
is a fair inference that the promise of such deferred compensation was at least partially relied on
by the employee as a reason for remaining with the employer. An employee does not, however,
automatically "earn" a right to job security by mere longevity in the same way that he automati-
cally earns a pension. Hence, it is less plausible to infer from the mere fact that an employee
remains on his job that he does so in partial reliance on a personnel manual's promise of job
security. This inference may change, of course, where, for example, the shop has a seniority sys-
tem of some sort, e.g., Hepp v. Lockheed-California Co., 86 Cal. App. 3d 714, 150 Cal. Rptr. 408
(1978), or where the employee accepts his job--or rejects a competitive job--because of his desire
for security. E.g., Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Mich., 408 Mich. 579, 292 N.W.2d 880
(1980). But such special circumstances can be accommodated short of a sweeping enforcement of
all such unilateral promises. Moreover, and more importantly, absent such special circumstances,
there is no reason to infer the existence of any detriment.
A more plausible theory for enforcing the promises made in personnel manuals was recently
offered by the California Appellate Court in Cleary v. American Airlines, 111 Cal. App. 3d 443,
168 Cal. Rptr. 722 (1980). There the court noted that all contracts implicitly contain a separate
and independent covenant of "good faith and fair dealing." Id at 453, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 727-28.
See generally Burton, Breach of Contract and the Common Law Duty to Perform in Good Faith, 94
HARV. L. REV. 369 (1980). See also Criscione v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 66 Ill. App. 3d 664, 384
N.E.2d 91 (1978). The court concluded that the fact that the employer's policy manual only au-
thorized termination for good cause, when taken in conjunction with this implied covenant and
the plaintiff's 18 years of satisfactory service, meant that the employer was "estopped" from termi-
nating the plaintiff at will. I II Cal. App. 3d at 455, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 729. The problem with this
theory is that the covenant of good faith performance is not a sort of free-floating requirement that
the parties to a contract behave in a gentlemanly manner. Rather, it is an obligation that they will
perform the promises in the contract in a fair, reasonable manner so as to avoid rendering them
illusory. See, e.g., Wood v. Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon, 222 N.Y. 88, 118 N.E. 214 (1917). In the
case of an employer who ignores promises contained in a personnel manual the issue is not
whether he has acted with bad faith--that is an all but forgone conclusion. Rather the issue is
whether he has acted in bad faith with respect to a legally enforceable promise. Thus, Cleary's
citation to the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing merely begs the question.
In sum, there is no short cut around the detailed analysis of the facts of each case that appears
to be mandated by Carter and Sargent. Promises in an employment manual should be enforce-
able only if they are part of the employee's bargained-for consideration or if they fall within the
provisions of RESTATEMENT § 90.
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long-standing line of its own decisions and failed to protect adequately
the interests of innocent employees.
The court considered the rights of at will employees in Ryan v. J C
Penney Co. There is a discernible trend in the states falling within the
Seventh Circuit toward recognizing restrictions on an employer's abil-
ity to discharge employees having contracts of indefinite duration.
Nevertheless, the Seventh Circuit applied the relevant state law con-
servatively, and arguably incorrectly, to find an employee terminable at
will despite an employer's assurance that termination would only be for
good cause.
In its only labor decision to be taken to the Supreme Court, the
Seventh Circuit held that no confidential employee is protected by the
NLRA. While this decision clearly undercuts significant policies un-
derlying the Act, a careful analysis of the legislative history indicates
that the decision was consistent with the congressional intent. Despite
this, the Supreme Court reversed, finding confidential employees pro-
tected by the Act.

